Through a field experiment in Sri Lanka I analyze the role of experimentally-induced memories of 2004 tsunami on behavior in a trust game in which personal notions of cheating are elicited. Micro-finance borrowers were randomly assigned to a treatment (control) group consisting in watching a video about the calamity before (after) playing. Trust game participants were asked how much to receive (return) in order not to (make the counterpart) feel cheated; in a survey they selected whether the video mostly reminded about solidarity, looting or the calamity experience. Results suggest a differential impact of emotional stimuli induced by the video-treatment on trustors' definition of cheating and trustees' intentional cheating. Among the treated, the probability trustors define cheating as a non-negative return on investment (i.e. receive no more than what invested) and trustees satisfy trustor's cheating notion (i.e. return at least what makes him/her not feel cheated) is higher when recalling solidarity than when looting and/or the calamity. As expected, there are no significant emotional effects of the video on control group's behavior. If the trust game replicates real investment decisions, identifying the channels through which emotional memories of a past shock affect behavior offer important insights on what hinders socio-economic transactions within post-disaster areas.
Introduction
In the last years the experimental literature on social preferences in developing countries has witnessed a huge growth due to the increasing number of field-studies providing insights on what influences individuals' decisions in vulnerable contexts. In particular, a part of this literature is being investigating the impact of natural or man-made disasters on time, risk and social preferences by comparing affected and non-affected individuals or villages. 1 From the seminal articles by Elster (1998) and Loewenstein (2000) underlining the importance of emotions in economic decisions, another part of the experimental literature is being recently investigating how positive, negative or neutral affect induced in the lab influence individuals' behavior. This study bridges the two literatures by investigating the role of emotional memories of a past shock on socio-economic investment decisions of individuals exposed to frequent shock-recalling stimuli in their everyday life. The latter are likely to be subject to continuous incidental emotional states deriving from the external environment (i.e., for instance, broken roads, damaged houses, injured relatives, etc.) which might influence actual and expected behavior in different ways according to the emotional characteristics of the most salient affected/non-affected individuals' memory of the shock. In this work the impact of tsunami-related memories on social preferences in Sri Lanka is analyzed by testing whether and how emotions induced by a short videoclip refreshing the calamity experience affect individual's decisions in an anonymous one-shot trust game (Berg et al., 1995) . This paper offers an original contribution to the above-mentioned literature in many respects. First, this experiment is implemented 7 years after the shock so that it is capable to catch long run effects of the disaster on social preferences by exploiting the random variation in emotional status associated to different memories of the event. Specifically, in order to refresh the emotional stimulus of the past calamity, a sample of Sri Lankan micro-finance borrowers was showed a video on the 2004 tsunami 2 . Importantly, half sample was randomly assigned to 1 Notably, these studies often reach different conclusions even when they focus on the same area or use a similar design. With respect to natural shocks, Callen (2010) Becchetti et al. (2012) find that the recovery aid restored the loss of altruism witnessed by Sri Lankan tsunami-victims after 7 years from the event. As far as manmade calamities are concerned, evidence of higher discount rates is provided by Voors et al. (2010) for individuals exposed to violence in Burundi while civil war is showed to be detrimental for trust and trustworthiness in Kenya (Becchetti et al., 2014) and Tajikistan (Cassar et al., 2013) . 2 The use of video clips to induce different emotions is common in psychological literature and, recently, it is being adopted also for economic experiments. For instance, Johnson and Tversky (1983) find that incidental affect (i.e., a mood state) induced by reading an article on newspapers influences risk judgments; see also, among others, Gross and Levenson (1995) , Kirchsteiger et al. (2006) and Oswald et al.(2008) for similar studies on affect and behavior. a treatment consisting in watching the clip before they could take decisions in a one-shot trust game while the remaining one to a control group who watched it after the game. Their decisions in the trust game are then compared on the basis of survey answers to a question about what scenario the video mostly reminded to them -participants were asked to choose among solidarity, looting and the calamity experiences which can be psychologically categorized respectively as positive, negative and neutral affect. The design of an emotional-based experiment frames this study in the economic and psychological literature on the role of mood manipulation on subjects' behavior and, more generally, on the importance of emotions in socio-economic decision making (see, among others, Loewenstein, 2000, Loewenstein and Lerner, 2003 , Vohs et al, 2004 and Isen, 2008 . 3 As an example, through different mood-manipulating treatments Ifcher and Zarghamee (2011) find subjects assigned to positive affect-inducing treatment show lower time preference than do those exposed to a neutral affect-inducing one. With this design, however, rather than inducing alternative moods with different videos, only one video treatment is implemented: all participants watched the same video clip and and their different emotional reactions to its content are collected in an post-experimental survey. A part from replicating the real-world situation in which all inhabitants are exposed to the same calamity but can react in different emotional ways to it, the treatment-control design based on projecting the video before-after the game allows also to control for potential individual's heterogeneous characteristics influencing emotional responses and/or experimental behavior. 4 The second original contribution of this study hinges on a novel experimental feature. A standard trust-investment game (Berg et al. 1995 ) is implemented, where -in an anonymous setting -a player (trustor) is endowed with a sum of money and has to decide how much to send to the counterpart (trustee); the amount sent is tripled and the trustee chooses how much of it to return to the trustor. The novel modification of this standard game consists in the elicitation of subjects' notion of "being cheated" as the amount of money the trustor would need to receive in order not to feel cheated (cheating threshold ) and the amount of 3 In the growing economic literature on the role of emotions, positive affect has been shown to increase reciprocity (Kirchsteiger et al., 2006) , productivity (Oswald et al., 2008) , loss (Isen et al., 1988) and risk aversion (Isen and Geva, 1987) ; other studies provide experimental evidence on the influence of emotions on how people price products (Lerner et al., 2004) and on their attitudes related to trust (Dunn and Schweitzer, 2005) . 4 Eliciting subjects' mood after a movie is not a novel methodology for experimental psychologists. Andrade (2005) and Andrade and Ariely (2009) exposed participants to a 5 minutes clip followed by a task in which they were asked to describe a personal experience related to the movie; differently from this setting, their participants were assigned to angry or a happy affect-inducing treatments. Västfjall et al. (2008) find that the affect elicited by reminding a Swedish undergraduates about the 2004 tsunami disaster negatively influences their judgments of well-being, future optimistic thinking and risk perceptions. Importantly, they assume that recalling the tsunami automatically induces negative feelings; this, however, may not be always the case if victims' social preferences are positively affected by solidarity under the form of recovery aid (Becchetti et al., 2012) . The emotional responses to a video clip can be of many types as the results from this paper suggest and often not exogenous to experimental behavior. For instance, Galasso et al. (2013) find heterogenous effects of informational videotreatments on formal childcare on 1500 Italian women's intended labor supply. For this reason, the before/after video design implemented in this study is also capable to capture positive, neutral and negative moods induced by the exposition to all subjects to the same tsunami-recalling clip and -differently from Västfjall et al. (2008) and Galasso et al. (2013) -to address potential bias deriving from non-exogenous emotional responses to it. money the trustee would return in order not to make the trustor feel cheated (expected cheating threshold ). Such a modification allows for the identification of how different emotional responses to a videoclip influence two original behavioral outcomes, namely the trustor's propensity to show a "less demanding" cheating notion and the trustee's propensity to "cheat intentionally", i.e. the probability the former has a cheating notion corresponding to a non-negative return on in investment (i.e. receiving no more than the amount sent in order not to feel cheated) and the probability the latter returns no less than the expected cheating threshold of the counterpart (i.e. giving back at least what (s)he believes would make the trustor not to feel cheated). 5 The elicitation of such cheating thresholds is important since it allows to i) control for a potential source of heterogeneity in individuals' behavior in the trust game originating from their implicit (and personal) notions of how the others should behave and ii) understand further if and how the elicited cheating notions respond to emotional changes caused by environmental shocks reproduced in the treatment. The elicitation of subjects' cheating notion has been first implemented by Butler et al. (2012) who shows in a lab-experiment involving Italian students that both parties in a trust game have personal notions of cheating and that these notions are determined by parentally-transmitted values. This paper builds on these findings by showing that such cheating notions may not be deterministic if they vary in response to emotional stimuli which in a real world are spread almost everywhere. 6 Descriptive and econometric results provide evidence of a positive impact of recalling solidarity on the probability of playing i) as "less demanding" trustors with a cheating notion corresponding to a non-negative return of investment (i.e. receiving at least what invested in order not to feel cheated) and ii) as "reliable" trustees by returning no less than the expected cheating notion of the counterpart. Importantly, a significant effect of watching the tsunami video on game behavior is found only when accounting for differential emotional responses to the treatment. In fact, treated participants who mostly recall solidarity show a higher probability of having a cheating threshold not above the amount sent (returned) than those mostly recalling the calamity itself and/or looting experiences. Such effects cancel out when considering the video exposure only, i.e. without taking into account the different emotional reactions generated by it. If, on the one hand, selecting a sample of micro-finance borrowers may limit the external validity of the results, it improves however on their causal interpretation since, on the other, potential problems of unobserved heterogeneity (very common in the related literature) are reduced by the implementation of a before/after treatment assignment described above and 5 The positive-return rule hypothesis is in line with the assumption (not tested) by Berg et al. (1995) that trustors feel cheated by a negative return on their investment (i.e. amount sent). Consistently with such return rule of trusting, more recently Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004) and Bohnet et al. (2008) in eliciting subjects' betrayal aversion measure trustworthiness as the proportion of agents choosing the highest principal's payoffyielding outcome. See also Butler et al. (2012) for a definition of cheating notions on the basis of personal return on investment rules. 6 Examples of direct emotion manipulation are -for instance -advertisement campaigns run by public or private companies for their marketing strategy.
through the implicit process of bank screening and/or self-selection which ensures that microfinance borrowers share most of the observable (and plausibly unobservable) characteristics (i.e., for instance, entrepreneurial skills, trustworthiness, etc.).
Under the assumption that the trust game replicates most of real-world investment decisions, the main results from this paper may have important economic implications. First, they provide experimental evidence that in post-disaster contexts characterized by asymmetric information and incomplete contracts artificially-induced positive affect can foster the social or economic transactions which would not take place because of the underlying risk of being cheated. Second, if "[. . . ] affective shocks are ubiquitous [. . . ]" as argued by Ifcher and Zarghamee (2011) this is even more so in contexts affected by a natural calamity in which villagers are likely to be reminded about it -and therefore emotionally affected -on a regular basis in their everyday can be harnessed also through emotion manipulation, investigating the hidden and belief-based determinants of trust and trustworthiness can play an important role for the design of policies aimed at fostering economic growth and development in vulnerable areas. 7 The remainder of paper is divided into five sections. In the second a detailed description of the research design is provided. In the third descriptive findings and results from non-parametric tests on balancing properties and behavior in the trust game are reported. The fifth section contains results and comments from the econometric analysis. The seventh section concludes by discussing the socio-economic implication of the main findings.
Research Design
The following subsections report a description of the context, the sampling scheme, the games implemented and the post-experimental survey. Notice that the research project is composed by three parts, i.e in the order i) an experimental session composed by a trust and a risky decision game, ii) a socio-demographic survey and iii) a final lottery game. The treatment 7 The literature on the economic role of trust and trustworthiness is extremely vast. For instance, they are deemed as "lubricants" (Arrow, 1974) of the socioeconomic system, substitutes of formal contracts (Becchetti and Conzo, 2011) , factors which significantly reduce transaction costs in socio-economic transactions by helping to "enforce cooperative agreements in bilateral sequential exchanges" (Greig and Bohnet, 2008 ) and improve quality of institutions (Putnam, 1993 ; La Porta et al., 1997), firm productivity (Chami and Fullenkamp, 2002) as well as the development of interethnic economic relationships and therefore economic performance (Alesina et al., 1999; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005 ).
-described in more details below -is based on watching a tsunami-videoclip before/after the decisions in the experimental session. This paper focuses just on the outcomes of the trust game for two reasons, i.e. i) there are no effects of the treatment/control assignment and the consequent emotional responses on the behavior in the risky investment game 8 and ii) the risky decision game implemented to elicit time preferences is a very simplified version of standard games involving more sophisticated procedures to depict the entire risk aversion curvature through variation in lottery's payoffs and probabilities. Hence participants' choices in the risky decision and the lottery games can be interpreted as rough proxies for risk and time preferences and are added as controls in the regression analysis.
Translators were intensively trained on the questionnaire, the game and standard experimental rules until they reached a satisfactory level of comprehension before starting the fieldwork.
The experimental sheets for each game, the entire questionnaire and the English script of the video are reported respectively in the Appendices A, B and C. With respect to sampling, from a list of borrowers of a local micro-finance institution (Agro Micro Finance, hereon AMF) 390 borrowers were randomly selected and stratified by tsunamivictimization status 9 with the assistance of the AMF staff who personally came to know about the personal conditions of all borrowers soon after the calamity. Participants to the experiment were selected from three villages located on the southern coast of Sri Lanka, i.e. Galle, Matara and Hambantota. As outlined in the introduction, the limited external validity of results based on a sample of micro-finance borrowers can be compensated by a stronger internal validity in terms of their causal interpretation because of the reduced observed and likely unobserved sample heterogeneity. The initial screening by AMF and/or the potential self-selection into borrowing may reasonably reduce potential sample differences which may not be orthogonal to social preferences and/or emotional responses. 10 8 Results are omitted for reasons of space and consistency with the main focus of the paper but are available upon request. 9 Note that after the data-cleaning the sample size reduced to 386 observations because 4 participants fail to complete the entire interview process. 10 As confirmed by AMF staff, the sample is not likely to be affected by post-tsunami migration since soon after 6
The context and the sampling scheme

The games and the survey
Selected borrowers were interviewed house-by-house simultaneously by two teams composed by an academic researcher and a translator. They were told they could real money by participating into a research project composed of three parts, i.e. an experimental session, a sociodemographic survey and a final lottery game. As far as the experimental session is concerned, two games were implemented, i.e. a trust game (TG) and a risky investment game (RG). The two games were randomly alternated to avoid order effects. The TG is a standard and simple game largely adopted in the experimental literature to elicit social preferences under the form of trust and trustworthiness in an incentive compatible way (see, among others, Berg at al. 1995).
The game involves two players, a Trustor (TR) and a Trustee (TE). 11 In this experiment, the TG was conducted only for one single round and full anonymity condition was respected so that no participants could know the counterpart's identity or see the pool of participants involved in the experiment. Both the TR and TE were endowed with 300 LKR (the equivalent of 5.74 e) and TR had to select the amount x to send to TE. The strategy method largely used in the literature on trust games was implemented for trustees: TE received 3x and had to decide how much of it to return to the TR for each possible TR choice. According to the standard rational- The RG provided a behavioral measure of risk aversion through a simple game which did not require a high degree of participants' and translators' familiarity with numbers or probabilities.
This game was implemented in a different context also by Charness and Genicot (2009) and Gneezy and Potters (1997) and is based on a single investment decision. In the experimental design of this paper, each participant was endowed with 300 LKR and had to decide whether keeping the money (option 1) or investing a fraction x of it in a risky asset with 50 percent probability of success (option 2). The investment would pay 3x if successful but 0 if not with the participant keeping all the uninvested units. The amount x can be interpreted as rough proxy of risk aversion (the higher the investment, the less risk averse being the individual).
the calamity damaged (and, indirectly, non-damaged) individuals received incentives to stay under the form of i) incoming flows of recovery aid and ii) concession of micro-loans at favorable conditions. AMF's loan-portfolio suffered severe losses because of the insolvency of tsunami-affected individuals; however, soon after the calamity it was recapitalized in an effective way as the evidence provided by Castriota (2010, 2011) suggests. 11 The wording was kept neutral in all games in order to avoid frame effects. For instance, the game was never presented as "trust game", but rather denominated "TG". Roles were phrased as "player 1" and "player 2" respectively for TR and TE.
12 First order beliefs (FOBs) for TR and TE -i.e. the amount expected from the other player -were also elicited through money incentivized questions.
At the end of the experimental session, participants were asked to answer to standard sociodemographic and economic questions as well as to questions regarding their social attitudes, the kind and intensity of the damage they received in the 2004 on seven dimensions (i.e. personal injuries, injuries to family members, damages to house, economic activity, buildings/assets, working tools, raw materials) and of the recovery aid on eight dimensions (i.e. money, credit, food, medicines, raw materials, working tools, consumption, other). Importantly, participants were asked to select what the tsunami videoclip mostly reminded them about among three possible experiences, i.e. solidarity, looting and the calamity itself. Each option was also associated to evocative words referring to similar domains, i.e. respectively altruism/cooperation, opportunism, tsunami/natural disaster (see the questionnaire in the Appendix B). B was increased so to make the "patient" option more attractive. 13 The switch point -namely, the potential lottery number at which the participant switches from option A to option B -can be interpreted as a measure of impatience. 14 
Treatment assignment: the video-clip on tsunami
As far as the treatment assignment is concerned, each participant was showed a two minutes video consisting of visual and auditive description (i.e. images and a background voice) about the calamity and flows of the recovery aid received after the shock. 15 The source of exogenous variation in the emotional responses accounting for game decisions derives from the timing of the treatment assignment: half of the sample was randomly selected to watch the clip before starting the experimental section (i.e. before they actually could make decisions in the games) and the other half of the sample did it soon after the experimental part but before the survey 13 Note that in a preliminary version of the experiment a more complex experimental scheme was designed to elicit risk and time preferences by using an approach more closely related to Andersen et al. (2008) and Holt and Laury (2002) . Once in the field, I instead opted for the simpler one described above, thus sacrificing completeness/complexity for an adequate level of comprehension for both translators and participants. Consequently, more reliable data were collected since with the original framework each interview process would have lasted for more than two hours and a half with the risk of generating non reliable answers (because of the high stress induced to translators and participants).
14 More specifically, the later (sooner) the switch from option A to B -i.e. the higher (lower) the switch number -the more (less) participants were considered as impatient. 15 The video is available at the following link: https://www.dropbox.com/s/8fgtfsl53ykroxq/Sri%20Lanka% 201.mov. An English version of the script is reported in the Appendix C.
8
(i.e. after they took decisions in the games). Hereon the former is considered as treatment group and the latter as control.
Such a before-after treatment design allows to isolate and control for possible non-random personal unobserved characteristics which can influence either emotional responses to the video (i.e. answers to the question about what the video mostly reminded of) or decisions in the games or both. In particular by controlling for emotional responses before and after the game it is possible to account for potential group-heterogeneous traits which might bias the main findings. However, as outlined in the next sections, participants do not significantly differ in terms of observable characteristics when compared by their emotional responses to the video exposure.
The protocol
At the beginning of the interview, the participant was told about the sequence of the interview process, i.e. an experimental session composed of two games, a survey and a final lottery. (S)he was informed that (s)he would be paid just for one randomly extracted game.
The game was extracted before (s)he played so that her/his decisions in the game could not affect game-selection for payment.
As far as the TG is concerned, the participant was told that, if that game would be extracted for payment, (s)he could earn real money (up to 1200 LKR) according to her/his own or the matched counterpart's choices in the game. The game was explained and the participant was informed about her/his role, i.e. TR or TE. Then the game started and the participant reported her/his choices. If the participant was chosen to be a TE, the strategy method described above was implemented by asking him/her how much s(he) would return to the TR for each possible TR's send-choices (i.e. 30, 60, . . . , 300 LKR) considering that each possible TR's amount sent would be tripled before getting to the TE. If the participant was chosen to be a TR, (s)he was asked how much of the endowment (300 LKR) (s)he would send to the TE knowing that it would be tripled and that the TE could choose to return some or no money back. For both players personal cheating notions were finally elicited through the questions mentioned above. 16 The protocol was similar for the RG. Participants were told they could earn up to 900 LKR (if the RG was selected for payment) depending on their choice and the outcome of a fair coin that would be tossed at the end of the whole interview. Then the game was explained and the participant made his/her decision. When the experimental session ended, the socio-demographic survey was delivered and, finally, the lottery game was implemented as described above.
Note that if the participant was assigned to the treatment group, (s)he watched a video on the interviewer's laptop before playing the trust and the risky decision games. If, instead, (s)he was assigned to the control group, the video was showed after the participants played the TG 16 Players' FOBs were elicited and 50 LKR paid for a correct guess.
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and RG but before the survey and the lottery game.
Game payments
At the end of the final lottery game the interviewer opened the envelope containing the game extracted for payment. If the game was the RG, s(he) tossed the coin and payed the subject according to her/his choice if (s)he opted for option 2; we payed 300 LKR otherwise.
If the game selected for payment was the TG, to make the payment feasible the research teams exchanged MMS messages containing a photograph of their player's TG answer sheet.
The TR was showed the answers of the matched TE on the researcher's mobile phone which were collected and sent by the researcher of the other team. The TR was then payed according the amount (s)he sent and the corresponding TE's return-choice for that amount. Similarly, the TE was showed a photograph of the answer sheet of the matched TR and paid accordingly. The TE's and TR's final payoff was calculated considering also their remaining game endowments plus a participation fee of 200 LKR. 17 As far as the payment for the lottery is concerned, participants were informed that when all the other interviews were finished, researchers would extract one out of all the names of the people interviewed; the lucky person would be the only winner of the lottery. Then, researchers would extract from another urn a number from 1 to 8 and pay the winner only according to his/her choice in the potential lottery number equal to the extracted one. 18 Despite the potential interviewer-bias due to the presence of a translator, truthful reporting is ensured by the large amount at stake given participants' standards of living. Even ignoring the payment from the lottery, the maximum payoff from the RG game for instance (900 LKR) represents in the sample about 51 percent of the median per capita monthly food expenditure; the percentage is even higher for the TG where the maximum payoff is 1200 LKR. 19 Insert Table 1 1. trustors have a "less demanding" cheating threshold corresponding to a non-negative return on investment rule, i.e. receiving no more than the amount invested in order not to feel cheated; 2. trustees play "reliably" by returning at least what they believe the trustors would receive in order not to feel cheated.
-Hypothesis 3 : given the structure of the experimental design, no significant effects of emotional responses are observed in the control group on trustors' and trustees' game behavior.
Sample characteristics and balancing properties
The demographic statistics reported in Panel A of Table 2 show that participants have on average 47 years, 4.5 household members and 10.5 years of schooling. The majority of them (83 percent) are married and slightly more than a half (54 percent) suffered from at least one type of damage from the tsunami (variable Damaged ) while about 35 percent received at least one type of recovery assistance (variable Aid ); 30 percent of the sample declares to have problems in providing daily meals and most of them are employed in the trading and manufacturing sector (37 and 32 percent respectively).
Insert Table 2 about here As showed in Panel B of Table 2 most participants were reminded about solidarity (46 percent) while those recalling mostly looting and the calamity experience are respectively 29 and 25 percent of the sample. Such a difference confirms the first hypothesis since -because of observable or unobservable personal traits or experiences -people respond in emotionally different ways even if exposed to the same stimulus. 20 Panel C of Table 2 documents that almost 70 percent of participants are relatively impatient and, on average, 60 percent of the amount at disposal is invested in the risky option (variable Riskloving). Consistently with many trust game outcomes in the experimental literature, on average trustors sent about one third or their initial endowment; the trustees returned an amount (averaged over all the strategy choices) corresponding to 20 percent of the tripled maximum amount the trustor could send (variable Mean Return). As far as the cheating thresholds are concerned, in order not to feel cheated trustors need to receive on average 30 percent more than the mean amount sent -the difference in absolute terms between the average trustor's contribution (variable Send ) and the average trustor's cheating threshold (variable TR cheat) is 41.61 LKR. Trustees on average believe that the trustors' cheating notion corresponds to receiving at least 173.26 LKR (variable TE cheat), i.e. 13 percent higher than the actual average TR's cheating threshold but 5 percent lower than the average TE's return choice. Interestingly, the average fraction of "less demanding" trustors defining a cheating notion according to a nonnegative return on investment rule (i.e. with a cheating threshold at least equal to the amount invested -variable P r(T R cheat ≤ Send)) is 40 percent while "reliable" trustees are on average 50 percent (i.e. those returning on average no less than their expected TR's cheating threshold -variable Avg P r(Return ≥ T E cheat)) 21 . Table 3 Insert Table 3 about here 20 This is the reason why only one video-treatment was implemented (and differential emotional reactions to it were elicited) instead of exposing subjects to different video-treatments. In the latter case the chance of having differential (uncontrolled) emotional responses would have been higher -as the evidence by Galasso et al. (2013) would suggest -and therefore not helpful for a causal interpretation of the impact of emotions on game behavior. 21 Note that the variable Avg P r(Return ≥ T E cheat) has been built by generating an indicator equal to one whenever TE returned in each strategy choice no less than the expected TR's cheating threshold (i.e. variable P r(Return ≥ T E cheat)); then the indicator has been averaged over all the eleven TE's choices so to have the TE's mean (strategic) propensity to play as a "reliable agent". 22 The only variables on which the confronted groups are statistically different at 5 percent significance level are i) the village dummies in comparisons by treatment assignment and ii) schooling years and Problems meal in comparisons by emotional reactions. Arguably, this may not represent a bias in the estimates since i) all these variables are controlled for in the regression analysis, ii) the magnitude of the difference on schooling years by emotional responses is not large (i.e. just one year) and iii) the before/after treatment emotional response (variable recall solidarity) is accounted for in the regression analysis. With this last check the potential endogeneity of the "recall" variables to game behavior is controlled for.
As a further robustness check, the previous tests are repeated by comparing sample characteristics by emotional responses separately for those who watched the video before playing the game (treatment group) and for those who did it after (control group). Results are reported respectively in Panel A and B of Table 4 and confirm the previous findings. A part from schooling years and the number of household components for which the difference in magnitude is very small, treated subjects -when compared by emotional responses -are similar on most observable (and, likely, unobservable) characteristics. Similarly, control participants do not statistically differ in terms of their emotional reactions on most of the characteristics considered so far.
Insert Table 4 about here Incidentally, under these previous preliminary tests treated and non treated participants do not show significant differences on their tsunami damage status (variable Damaged ) nor the aid received (variable Aid ). Moreover, no significant differences are found when comparing them by emotional reactions. Tables 3 and 4 also show risk attitudes do not significantly differ by video or emotional responses (variable Riskloving) while -as showed below -trust game variables do change in response to the treatment. For this reason, as outlined before, the rest of the analysis concentrates on the behavioral variations in the trust game and use risk (and time) attitudes as controls. 23 
Behavior in the TG by treatment and emotions
Non-parametric tests are implemented to check whether trust game behavior was affected either by the treatment or by emotional reactions or by both. Results are reported in Table   5 Insert Table 5 about here.
Results from the non-parametric tests reported in Table 5 suggest in general that the video treatment was effective in altering decisions in the TG only by inducing different affect in those exposed to the video before playing the game.
First, the treatment looks ineffective in altering TG behavior (Panel A) when the emotional reactions induced by it are not considered, whereas the latter per se do not explain much of the TG behavior (Panel B) when the treatment effect is not considered. Therefore, the only comparison under which one should expect a statistically significant change in the TG behavior is the one in which treated subjects are confronted by their emotional reactions while no significant changes in the TG should be observed when looking at the non-treated. This is actually the case as suggested by the results in Panels C-D of Table 5 which provide preliminary support to the third hypothesis.
Second, the game variables significantly affected by the treatment and emotions are the proportion of "less demanding" trustors and the proportion of "reliable" trustees which are in both cases higher for treated participants recalling solidarity -see variables P r(T R cheat ≤ Send) and Avg P r(Return ≥ T E cheat) in the Panel C of Table 5 T R cheat Send ≤ 1) is higher when they recall solidarity than when they recall looting and/or the calamity; in the latter case they tend to prefer a more demanding cheating notion (i.e. 
Econometric analysis
This section reports an econometric validation of the preliminary findings regarding the positive effects of recalling solidarity on the propensity to play as "less demanding" trustors and "reliable" trustee when accounting for i) potential endogeneity in emotional responses, ii) time and risk preferences and iii) differences in sociodemographic and economic characteristics of the sample.
Description of the model
As showed in equation 1, the estimated model for trustors is a standard probit in which the dependent variable is their propensity to define a "less demanding" cheating notion consistently with a non-negative return on investment rule (i.e. they would need to receive no more than what invested in order not to feel cheated):
24 One might argue that -because of the implementation of the strategy method -the trustee's expectation about the counterpart's cheating threshold maybe based on his/her first order beliefs (FOB), i.e. on what (s)he actually expects the trustor to have sent. For this reason, Figure 3 reports the kernel density of Return T E cheat restricted to cases in which T R Send is equal to the trustee's F OB; thus, the Return variable considers in this case only the trustee's return choice in response to the TR's possible contribution (T R Send) equal to what s(he) actually believes the trustor has sent to him/her (F OB). The preliminary results from the more general case commented above (Figure 2 ) are confirmed also under this further restriction (see Figure 3) . Note that players' FOB will be also controlled for through a robustness check in the econometric analysis. The estimated model for trustees is a standard probit similar to that in eq. 1. To exploit information from the full strategy of trustees, the dependent is now the TE's propensity to respond "reliably" to each possible amount the trustor can send consistently with his/her expected TR cheating threshold. In particular, the full model can be described by the following equation:
For any i-trustee an indicator variable named P r(Return ≥ T E cheat) is defined as being 
Estimation results: Trustors
Estimation results for the sample of trustors generally confirm the ones from the previous descriptive analysis and are reported in Table 6 . The first column documents that -without accounting for the different emotional variation induced -the video treatment alone does not significantly explain any variation in the propensity of playing as a "less demanding" trustors.
In the second column the treatment seems to increase this propensity only for those who recall solidarity relatively to those who recall looting or the calamity. This effect is robust to the introduction of tsunami (column 3) and game (column 4) controls.
Insert Table 6 about here.
To test for the robustness of this finding, the specification in column 4 is re-estimated separately for the treatment (column 5) and the control group (column 6). Results show that positive affect (recalling solidarity) for the treated increases their propensity to have cheating thresholds not above their investment of about 30 percent more than the negative/neutral affect (recalling looting/calamity) (variable Recall solidarity, column 5). As expected, positive affect does not significantly explain such propensity when the video is showed after playing (column 6).
As a further robustness check all the sociodemographic and economic controls mentioned above are introduced. Estimations results are reported in columns 7-9 and confirm the positive impact of recalling solidarity on the propensity for treated trustors to choose a "less demanding" cheating rule. Notice that the variable Recall solidarity in columns 2, 4, 6 and 7 captures the potential unobservable endogeneity due to non-random emotional responses to the video; since it is statistically insignificant in all specifications, a channel from the video to the emotional reaction and from the latter to the TR propensity to send more than (or the same as) the personal cheating threshold exists and can be interpreted in a causal way.
As pointed out by Ai and Norton (2004) , for a correct interpretation of the interaction effect in non-linear models it is necessary to compute a different formula to that used for linear models.
Specifically, the full interaction effect in non-linear models is the cross-partial derivative of the expected value of the dependent variable. By using an ad-hoc Stata package to compute the interaction effect according to suggested procedure (i.e. inteff, see Norton et al., 2004) , the mean effect of Video*Recall solidarity is estimated to be .31 for the full model (i.e. that in column 7, Table 6 ) with a z -stat equal to 2.033 and .38 for the model with only game controls (i.e. that in column 4, Table 6 ) with a z -stat equal to 2.651.
Estimation results: Trustees
Estimation results for the sample of trustees confirm the preliminary descriptive findings and are reported in Table 7 . In particular, a significant effect of the treatment on trustees' propensity to respond "reliably" -given their expected TR cheating threshold -is found only through the positive affect induced by recalling solidarity.
Insert Table 7 about here.
Specifically, the interaction between the treatment and the positive affect (variable Video * Recall solidarity) is significant and positive in column 3 and robust to the introduction of tsunami (column 4), game (column 5) and sociodemographic controls (column 9). When restricting the sample to the treatment (columns 5 and 10) and control group (columns 6 and 11), the positive emotional effect is significant only for the former while -as expected -it is not for the latter. In particular, the treated trustees' propensity to respond "reliably" rises of about 20 percent more if they mostly recall solidarity than if they mostly recall looting and/or calamity.
In addition, since such propensity is increasing in the TR's possible send-choices (variable Importantly, notice that also trustee's estimates do not report evidence of potential endogeneity in emotion reaction since the variable Recall solidarity is insignificant in all the specifications where the treatment (Video) and the interaction term (Video*Recall solidarity) are present (columns 2-4, 7-9, 12-13). 25 Similarly to what done for trustors, by using the above-mentioned Stata package to compute the correct interaction effect (Norton et al., 2004) , the mean effect of Video*Recall solidarity is estimated to be .14 for the specification in column 4 (Table 7 ) with a z -stat equal to 1.850 and .20 for that in column 8 (Table 7) with a z -stat equal to 2.039.
Discussion
The importance of emotions is not a novel discovery for the psychological literature (see, for People may often respond differently to the same emotional stimulus on the basis of personal subjective (and, likely, unconscious) traits which are not always observable to the econometrician. For instance, inhabitants of an area exposed to an unexpected natural disaster might be subject to continuous incidental emotional states deriving from the external environment (i.e., for instance, when looking at broken roads, damaged houses, injured relatives, etc.). Such states can be in turn affected by different memories of the past shock to which affected/non-affected people can react in a very specific way depending on their personal traits and/or experiences.
Most of the lab-experiments using films to artificially induce moods do not fully take into account the possibility that individuals' emotional responses after a film can go to different (or even opposite) directions. Back to the previous example, this maybe the case of individuals exposed to a past natural shock which -when reminded about it -can be affected in their behavior by positive, negative or neutral moods depending, for instance, on whether they mostly recall experiences of solidarity, looting or just the calamity itself. Evidence of heterogenous reactions to a common informational video-treatment is provided, among others, by Galasso To investigate the nexus between positive affect and the probability of playing as "less demanding" trustors and "reliable" trustees, I conducted a random-assignment experiment on a sample of micro-finance Sri Lankan borrowers affected/non-affected by the 2004-tsunami in which personal cheating notions are elicited (as in Butler et al., 2012) after artificially manipulating subjects' mood. All subjects watched a short videoclip on the 2004-tsunami; half of them were randomly assigned to watch it before (treatment group) while the remaining to watch it after (control group) playing the trust game. In a post-experimental survey information on which direction subjects' mood was altered were collected by asking whether the video mostly reminded them about solidarity (positive affect), looting or the calamity experience (negative or neutral affect).
Even controlling for direct tsunami effects in terms of damages and aid received (which turns out to be not significant), the experimental results document a differential impact of the emotional responses generated by the video on the propensity to play as "less demanding" trustors and "reliable" trustees according to own personal cheating notions. In particular, the probability for trustors to define cheating as a non-negative return on investment (i.e. receiving no more than what invested in order not to feel cheated) and for trustee to satisfy trustor's expected cheating notion (i.e. returning at least what would make him/her not feel cheated) is higher for those who recall solidarity than for those recalling looting and/or the calamity. If it provides further causal evidence about the role of emotions on trusting and trustworthy behavior, this study alone is not certainly sufficient to suggest policy-makers, NGOs or public/private companies how to exploit the nexus between moods and behavior to harness social capital. Additional research on the topic is needed in at least two directions, i.e. i) the impact of emotion manipulation in multi-round games where subjects can update their beliefs and ii) the time-length necessary for incidental emotions to alter subjects' behavior permanently or at least for a longer time horizon. Send amount sent by the Trustor (TR) TR cheat cheating threshold: amount of money S needs to receive back from R in order not to feel cheated TE cheat expected cheating threshold: amount of money R needs to send back in order not to make S feel cheated Trustor = 1 if the player is a TR; = 0 if the player is a TE.
Return TE amount returned in response to each TR possible choice (strategy method) Mean Return amount of money returned by TE (Return) averaged over all the 11 possible TR choices (strategy method) P r(T R cheat ≤ Send) proportion of TRs who define a cheating notion corresponding to a non-negative return on investment rule, i.e. receiving no more than what invested in order not to feel cheated P r(Return ≥ T E cheat) proportion of TEs returning strictly more than what they expect the TR needs to receive in order not to feel cheated P r(Return ≥ T E cheat) proportion of TEs returning equally to/more than what they expect the TR needs to receive in order not to feel cheated Avg P r(Return ≥ T E cheat) proportion of TEs returning equally to/more than what they expect the TR needs to receive in order not to feel cheated (averaged over the 11 retun choices) Age respondent's age Male =1 if the respondent is male Most can be trusted "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?". 1 = Have to be careful ; 2 = Most people can be trusted. Cant rely respondent's 1-5 Likert scale agreement on the statement: "Nowadays, you can't rely on anybody" People take advantage respondent's 1-5 Likert scale agreement on the statement: "If you are not careful, other people will take advantage of you" Trustindex (most can be trusted+cant rely+ people take advantage)/3 Loancycle total n. of loan repaid (borrower's seniority) Personal Injury =1 if the respondent reports personal injuries caused by tsunami Family Injury =1 if the respondent reports injuries to relatives caused by tsunami Damage house =1 if the respondent reports damages to the house caused by tsunami Damage econ activity =1 if the respondent reports damages to the economic activity caused by tsunami Damage assets =1 if the respondent reports damages to assets caused by tsunami Damage tools =1 if the respondent reports damages to working tools caused by tsunami Damage raw materials =1 if the respondent reports damages to raw materials caused by tsunami Damaged =1 if the respondent reports at least one type of damage. Money aid =1 if the respondent received financial aid (non microfinance) after the tsunami Credit aid =1 if the respondent received financial support (microfinance) after the tsunami Food aid =1 if the respondent received assistance in terms of food after the tsunami Medicines aid =1 if the respondent received assistance in terms of medicines after the tsunami Rawmaterials aid =1 if the respondent received assistance in terms of raw materials for repairing/rebuilding house after the tsunami Tools aid =1 if the respondent received assistance in terms of working tools after the tsunami Consumption aid =1 if the respondent received consumption aid after the tsunami Other aid =1 if the respondent received other kind of aid after the tsunami Aid index = sum of * aid dummies /8 Aid = 1 if Helpindex ¿ 0 Problems meal = 1 if the respondent has problems in buying or providing daily meals Video = 1 if the respondent has watched the video BEFORE the experimental session; = 0 if (s)he has watchad it AFTER the experimental session. Recall solidarity = 1 if the respondent through the video mostly recalled solidarity Recall calamity = 1 if the respondent through the video mostly recalled the calamity Recall looting = 1 if the respondent through the video mostly recalled looting Sociability standardized index of "sociability" = sum across all the groups the respondent belongs to (i.e. sporting, neighbour, religious, community, cultural, NGOs, political, other) divided by 8 (tot. number of groups) Table 6 : Probability of playing as a "less demanding" trustor Table 7 : Probability of playing as a "reliable" trustee 2 7 If the previous answer is [1] , [2] or [3] , how did it happen? [1] [2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
I did not need a credit and they (Bank, AMF, other MFI) went to my place to offer the possibility of obtaining one I needed a credit and they (Bank, AMF, other MFI) went to my place to offer the possibility of obtaining one I needed a credit and I spontaneously went to their place to ask for it (Bank, AMF, other MFI) I needed a credit and I went to their place (Bank, AMF, other MFI) to ask for it, because of other people's suggestion Others. Specify 36 How important was the support provided by AMF after the tsunami for your economic recovery (whether in terms of a new loan or in better conditions for the repayment of a previous loan)? [ 
